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Domestic transport costs are another area in which initial 
examination suggests a study of potential for and ways to 
reduction should have priority.
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(not certained)
Table of Contents
Summary
I. Introduction: Where We Are And Ways Out
Commodity Catch 22 
Stabilisation's Limits 
Additional Paths
Para i - viii
Para 1 - 1 4
(Para 1 - 4) 
(Para 5 - 8 )  
(Para 9 - 14)
II. New Products: Diversification Into What? Para 15 - 25
Random Walks (Para 15 - 18)
Import Substitution (Para 19)
Guidelines (Para 20 - 23)
Discovery (Para 24)
South-South (Para 25)
III. New Uses And/Or Markets Existing Exports Para 26 - 28
Uses
Composition
South-South
(Para 26) 
(Para 27) 
(Para 28)
IV. Cost Reducing Innovations: Overall
and Import Content Para 29 - 32
Import Substitution (Para 30)
New Technology (Para 31)
V. Marketing Para 33 - 43
Issues
How To Sell
Price Rings
New Markets
New Opportunities
Marketing Chain Participation
(Para 33)
(Para 34 - 36) 
(Para 37)
(Para 38)
(Para 39)
(Para 40 - 43)
VI. Processing And Manufacturing; Value Added 
and Industrial Value Para 44 - 96
VII.
VIII.
Complexities and Possibilities (Para 44 - 46)
Exogenous Barriers (Para 47 - 51)
Related Actions (Para 52 - 53)
Beverage Products (Para 54 - 58)
Sugar (Para 59)
Cigarettes (Para 60 - 62)
Textiles and Garments (Para 63 - 67)
Leather and Products (Para 68 - 70)
Wood Products (Para 71 - 74)
Vegetable Oil and Ghee (Para 75 - 78)
Fruits, Vegetables, Meat, Fish (Para 79 - 85)
Iron and Steel (Para 86 - 89)
Related Issues (Para 90 - 91)
Domestic Markets/By-products (Para 92 - 93)
Input Manufacturing (Para 94 - 96)
Secondary Commodity Inputs (Para 95)
Information Collection, Analysis And Access Para 97 - 104
General Data (Para 97 - 99)
Specific Studies (Para 100 - 101)
Market Data (Para 102 - 104)
Reflection Para 105 - 107
Window 2 
Prior Studies
(Para 105 - 106) 
(Para 107)
tSummary
i. Primary commodities are SSA's main exports. They are hardly the most 
promising lines for export growth either in market volume or price 
projection terms. But one cannot rewrite history and retrospectively 
change SSA's present export base.
ii. Brute force volume expansion across the board could - given price 
elasticities of demands - reduce net forex earnings for SSA as a whole.
So could random walk diversification into each other's main exports. 
Selective expansion and diversification can pay but for SSA as a whole 
is analogous to running up a down escalator.
iii. Commodity agreements with some volume control can limit price swings 
around a trend. Commodity agreement purchase funds can limit massive 
sudden price falls forced by distress selling. They cannot reverse the 
1976-86 trend to the lowest real prices in over 50 years for many 
commodities nor can they be expected with confidence to halt trend 
declines. Thus the probable 1988/89 activation of Window 1 of the 
Common Fund will be useful but not a panacea - especially for SSA.
iv. But SSA has - except for a few countries such as Mauritius and perhaps 
Zimbabwe - very poor prospects for short term breakthroughs into 
manufactured exports based on low unit cost of labour or acquired 
technological capability. Thus something needs to be done to raise the 
net export earnings flowing from present commodity exports.
v. A number of options (varying from commodity to commodity and country to 
country) exist:
a. New Products
b. New Uses and Markets
c. Cost Reducing Innovations
d. Marketing Participation
e. Pre-export processing and Manufacturing
f. Information Collection, Analysis and Use.
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vi. In each of these cases a series of conceptual and practical issues and 
a number of commodity cases in respect to which gains are likely to be 
attainable can be identified. The bulk of the paper is devoted to such 
an articulation.
vii. The lists presented are not taxonomic. Nor are they at the stage for 
direct action - except to identify areas for more in-depth general and 
for detailed pre-feasibility studies. But they do offer a partial 
format and articulation for setting up a programme of studies for 
UNCTAD's Commodities Division with the support of UNDP.
viii. These are not entirely new areas. They did appear - in fairly general 
terms - in the initial conceptualisations and formulations of the 
Integrated Programme for Commodities. They were - with the full 
support of many SSA governments - embodied in the Window 2 Common Fund 
articles. Funds have - tentatively - been pledged to Window 2. If the 
Common Fund comes into operation in 1988/89 its Window 2 should be a 
source of finance for operational projects or programmes flowing from 
the proposed programme of studies.
COMMODITY EARNINGS PROMOTION BY AND FOR SSA: 
Where Should We Be Looking?
By Reginald Herbold Green
Institute of Development Studies (Sussex)
To plan is to choose. 
Choose to go forward.
- Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Tanzania
We must look our mistakes squarely in the face.
Lest we fall into repeating them.
- Rui Baltasar Santos, Mozambique
I. Introduction: Where We Are and Ways Out
1. Since 1980 primary commodities (including petroleum) have not been the 
things in which to specialise. Both World Development Report and Trade 
and Development issues from 1981 through 1987 demonstrate that. They 
also show that as of 1987 there is every reason not to project 
substantial, sustained price recoveries for major primary products this 
side of the 1990s and little reason to assume 1990-95 will show much real 
price recovery. Despite sustained, if sluggish, OECD economy growth 
since 1982 many primary commodities are at their lowest real prices in 50 
to 60 years and likely to remain bumping along the bottom, oscillating or 
in some cases - e.g. cocoa - plumbing new depths.
2. Advice to SSA economies to rebuild exports and reduce trade deficits by 
producing more of their present exports may be sound advice for specific 
countries - especially for those with rehabilitable capacity (e.g. Ghana,
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Nigeria for cocoa; Uganda, Mozambique for tea). But at SSA level - and 
especially at Third World commodity exporter level - it is a recipe for 
reduced (not enhanced) export earnings. The price elasticities both of
demand and of short term supply, are very much below unity and for SSA's 
major exports below the SSA share of global exports.
3. Diversifying at random into each others' exports, e.g. Ghana, Nigeria
into palm oil, East African states into cocoa, Zimbabwe into coffee is 
slightly less problematic for the new (or returned) exporter, at least in 
the short run. But again it is an approach which runs foul of the 
fallacy of composition - all exporters (diversifiers) cannot gain at
once. If all seek to maintain market shares, all - even probably those 
who do force up their shares - will lose because the real resource and 
opportunity costs (including infrastructure of expanded and/or new) 
commodity production are substantial. At the best it is running up a 
down escalator.
4. Cocoa illustrates this dilemma. The 1950s planting boom in Ghana more
than doubled its output by the mid-1960s. Together with growth of 
exports elsewhere this broke the cocoa market. Rapid Cote d'Ivoire
output expansion beginning in the 1960s had less impact because it 
largely replaced Ghana and Nigeria declines. However, the 1969-72 
recovery of Ghanaian output parallel to the Ivoiirian upsurge played a 
role in prolonging the 1962-1972 slump. Malaysia's massive 1980s 
expansion into cocoa with exports nearing 100,000 tonnes in 1987 and
200,000 by the early 1990s has already triggered a severe price fall 
likely to continue with Ghanaian (and perhaps Nigerian) export recovery 
plus Malaysian trees coming into bearing preventing regaining the 
oscillating but not declining real prices of 1974-1984 when cocoa exports 
rose only 1 % a year.
5. Price stabilisation - if this means holding real unit export prices 
(nominal unit export prices divided by the import price list) - is 
unlikely to play a major role in improving the trend in commodity prices. 
No realistic amount of funding can maintain real prices if output growth 
is sharply in excess of the constant price consumption growth trend and 
price elasticities of demand are low. Precisely those conditions pertain 
in most commodity markets.
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6. Restraining supply growth can maintain trend real price stability but 
cannot avert year to year oscillations. The 197^-84 cocoa market 
illustrates this. So - up to a point - does the International Coffee 
Agreement. Up to a point because the salvation of the ICA has not been 
export quotas alone but periodic sharp output falls (usually related to 
frost in Brazil) which have allowed running down producer country stocks 
so there was not an ever-rising overhang.
7. Price stabilisation around the trend price can be achieved - if the 
stabilising body can ascertain the trend (as the Tin Agreement did for 
several decades but notably failed to do in the two-year run up to its 
demise - a demise also related to the rapid expansion of new, non-quota 
controlled output). Such a stabilisation has uses. It reduces the risk 
of very sudden and large falls in prices and SSA export earnings. For 
example, it might have been useful in 1986 as some prices which collapsed 
then - e.g. cotton, palm oil, certain metals - have since recovered a 
substantial share of 198 6 losses. It can also reduce the costs of
distress selling at lows by producers who can no longer hold on to the 
benefit of financially stronger merchant buyers who can hold on 6 to 18 
months for a price recovery. But neither of these quite real benefits 
can greatly affect the trend of real export earnings (earned import 
capacity) derived by SSA from primary commodity exports.
8. Therefore the probable 1988 activation of the Common Fund cannot by
itself, even with more Commodity Agreements, stabilise the downward (or 
turn up the static) real price trend for primary products even though 
Window One can reduce damaging swings around whatever trend exists.
9. In these circumstances new approaches to augmenting SSA earnings from
commodity exports are needed. This is not because given a free choice
one would advise specialising exports in these products. Far from it - 
especially as most SSA economies are so weak they will lose out in price 
cutting 'wars1 even if they are truly low cost producers (which is by no
means clear in some cases, e.g. tea, palm oil, cocoa). Rather it flows
from the fact that SSA's present level of other exports is - with a few
exceptions like Mauritius, Zimbabwe and, to a degree, Senegal and the
Ivory Coast - so low that even high percentage growth rates will take
until the end of the 1990s to become the backbone of export earnings. 
Further, the growth of protectionism in the North and the high cost of 
semi-skilled and skilled labour in SSA (because of low output per worker 
largely from lack of training and experience) will hinder rapid
non-commodity export expansion in labour intensive lines such as clothing 
and cloth which were the initial entry points of the present NICs.
10. Therefore, augmenting real import capacity by enhancing export value of 
primary products and doing so by some method other than brute expansion
of present major commodity export volume or real price trend
stabilisation is needed urgently. In fact this is not a new idea. It
was a secondary theme from 1975 on in relation to the Common Fund. Even
then it was an approach strongly backed by SSA states some of whom
expressed more faith in its financing modality - Window Two of the Common 
Fund - than in Window One and traditional price stabilisation.
11. The main heads under which action may be promising for some commodities 
by some countries or groups of countries include:
a. New export products (diversification);
b. New uses and/or markets for existing exports;
c. Cost reducing innovations in primary product production;
d. Participation in and/or altering modalities of international 
marketing;
e. Pre-export processing and/or manufacturing of present (or new)
primary exports;
f. Improving ability of commodity producing countries to acquire,
analyse and act on information relevant to marketing (including
timing and focusing of sales) and to forward production and
investment planning/resource allocation.
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12. It needs to be emphasized that not all lines of action are equally
promising in respect to all commodities nor are different producing
countries necessarily equally placed to take advantage of these lines in 
respect to the same commodity. Similarly the opportunity/need for policy 
and action coordination vary from product to product (e.g. higher for 
cocoa than for cashew nuts), line of action to line of action (e.g. 
higher for information collection and basic analysis than for 
processing), country by country (usually higher for smaller, poorer 
countries).
13. The following articulations of these lines of action do not purport to be
complete lists of possibilities. They are an illustrative set of
examples. Still less are they based on feasibility studies; they are a 
selected check list toward mounting pre-feasibility studies.
14. The compilation of a taxonomic list; the identification and carrying out 
of pre-feasibility studies and the rapid movement from them through 
feasibility and design stage to implementation should be a major priority 
for UNDP and UNCTAD over 1988—90. The Common Fund's Window Two can be 
envisaged to be one source - and a catalyst for other sources - of 
subsequent action programme and project finance.
II. New Products: Diversification Into What?
15. Diversification is once again fashionable as it was in the 1950s. 
Unfortunately inadequate attention is usually paid to the differences in 
gains/costs for the individual country, SSA countries as a group and 
commodity producers as a whole.
16. Clearly - if, e.g. - Ghana diversifies into palm oil and Malaysia into 
cocoa Ghana will gain on additional export earnings on palm oil and lose 
from the price depressing effects of Malaysia's cocoa exports pressing 
upon low trend demand growth at constant prices and low price 
elasticities of demand while Ghana's palm oil exports operate similarly 
on that market (with Malaysia the potential main loser).
17. It is true that if one takes total output of each commodity as fixed and
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also holds each country's share of all commodity exports constant there 
is a case for each country to have several not one export. The case is 
based on relative stability. Both on global price and on production 
(often highly weather linked) sides some cross cancelling among 
commodities is likely. How much is variable and may not be high.
However, this is far from being a case for rapid expansion into new low 
price elasticity of demand, low trend constant price demand growth 
commodities while seeking to maintain market share in the old. The very 
successful - at least for Malaysia and until recently - Malaysian 
diversification into palm oil (where it is now leading exporter) and 
currently cocoa (where by 1990 it will be third or fourth exporter) led 
to 1986s vegetable oil market collapse and is a main factor in the 
ongoing fall in the price of cocoa.
The route of diversification into commodities to replace food or 
industrial imports (e.g. Ghana back into cotton, Tanzania into rubber, 
Rhodesia - as it then was - into coffee) may have a better case. If the 
diversifying country is highly import constrained, its additional 
production may well not (or not substantially) reduce effective global 
import demand. But the case is either an import substitution or an 
integrated industrial sector rather than an export expansion one. The 
overlap arises when - as in the case of Zimbabwe's irrigated, relatively 
high cost coffee - output overshoots domestic use and does spill over 
into export diversification.
The most desirable products into which to diversify are ones:
a. with a relatively high rate of growth of world demand at constant
prices related to high income elasticity or learning effect (linked 
to new tastes or new technology);
b. a market large enough or old enough to be sure long term resource
allocation is not being made to a fad market that may collapse
speedily (e.g. a past dried banana and possibly the current green 
ginger 'boom');
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c. a market in which a relatively small share will add significantly to 
the diversifying country's export earnings;
d. some cost or marketing/market access (tax preference, easy/cheap 
transport, etc) advantages to the diversifier as opposed to other new 
products or expansion in existing ones.
Very few of SSAs present large exports meet these tests. However for a 
number of countries tropical ("exotic”) fruits and vegetables and 
temporate ("out of season") vegetables and fruits may well do so. 
Flowers are a related product or product clusters. The prerequisites for 
successful exploitation of these commodities include:
a. cost advantages (over competitors) in production demonstrated in 
serious costing studies;
b. reliable, rapid transport facilities with ancillary storage
arrangements;
c. precisely identified (by country, buyer group, time of year and 
marketing structures) markets;
d. creation of appropriate infrastructural and entrepreneurial 
structures on the production side together with links to reliable
overseas buyers with established links to distribution.
All of the above take time - and real resources. But for some countries 
eg Kenya, Zimbabwe they have allowed significant export expansion. More 
could follow - not all and not all for the same products. One key issue 
on "exotic" (new tropical) products is whether to seek volume at the cost
of low prices (e.g. to seek to establish - say - mangoes as in the
orange-apple-banana-pineapple league) or to seek a limited volume, high 
price slot (the current strategy of West African and Kenyan mango 
exporters but one which Indian, Brazilian and Puerto Rican exporters' 
apparent dash for growth may undermine).
23» Export issues aside, horticultural and orchard crops do have certain 
advantages over many other commodities. The value of output per hectare
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and the labour input required per hectare are both high and the actual 
production (albeit not the collection and marketing) are suitable for 
middle and small farmers.
24. A different type of diversification arises when a new potential commodity 
export is "discovered" or "created". This is usually a
mineral/hydrocarbon one. e.g. if a country discovers a sizeable natural 
gas field it usually faces four options: use for domestic power
generation (replacing oil fired thermal power or reducing the expansion 
of hydro capacity); use for raw commodity (lng) exports; use for 
petrochemical processing/manufacture (almost certainly ammonia and/or 
urea) for domestic use and commodity based export 
expansion/diversification; non exploitation because of scale or viability 
constraints. Similarly a new ore processing technology invented 
elsewhere may turn a previously useless ore body into a figurative or 
literal gold mine (e.g. the Renco gold mine in Zimbabwe). On the demand 
side technology changes can increase demand. For specific commodities -
e.g. cobalt and platinum in the past two decades it has had the effect 
of moving new deposits into viability and thereby diversifying exports.
25. The second kind of diversification is hard to study except in a country 
context. Two cases which may apply across a number of SSA economies are 
natural gas (especially natural gas fields in the absence of proven oil 
fields) and gold. In the case of natural gas there are problems as to 
tradeoff among uses as well as some potential for 
coordination/diversification of SSA uses since both the lng and 
ammonia/urea markets are such that a split in SSA export development 
between the two is likely to benefit new SSA exporters both jointly and 
severally. Gold economics have changed radically with gold price 
recovery, SSA devaluations and technological advances (especially in ore 
processing/refining). Thus many SSA ore deposits are targets for 
re-evaluation.
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III. New Uses And/Or Markets For Existing Exports
26. Some primary products could capture new uses if adequate research and
promotion were carried out. For example sisal pulp is technically 
comparable to rag and high grade hardwood pulp i.e. is suitable for
disposable garments, quality stationary, magazine paper. The technical 
snags of conversion seem to be almost solved; one or two small scale 
plants are in profitable operation using fairly simple technology. 
Sorting out issues of how to grow for this use (or a combined fibre and 
pulp sequence), optimal scale, transport is possible as - presumably - 
are trial runs by/promotion to users. But it is not being done and 
probably neither Kenya nor Tanzania nor Mozambique nor Malagasy has
personnel and financial resources to do it.
27. For other primary products research on treatment (or breeding in new
characteristics) is needed to limit damage from technology changes. In
rubber Malaysia has pioneered in processing/mixing to produce a variety 
of uniform forms of natural rubber each with certain specified 
characteristics. Without this, market loss to synthetics would have been 
much larger. To the extent problems of staple length or strength or 
uniformity have cost (are costing, will cost) cotton market share as a 
textile raw material, similar potential for applied research in micro 
biology or middle technology hybrid breeding and in processing probably 
exists and should be identifiable by exploring missing, desirable 
properties and potentials of specific breeding and processing 
technologies.
28. Cooperation among developing countries could help open broader markets 
for some primary exports. Most cotton is used in developing countries 
and they - as a group - are large importers (as well as large exporters). 
With trade preferences (sometimes even without) - especially plus less 
Northern subsidies on cotton exports as proposed by Cairns Group - 
substantial markets now held by North cotton could be captured and with 
South-South trade which accelerated growth these markets should expand. 
The same principle applies to South grain exporters though here the 
problem of heavy North subsidies needs to be faced as they are more 
pervasive and more massive than for cotton.
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IV. Cost Reducing Innovations; Overall and Import Content
29. Given probable price trends many primary products - not only but also not 
v least in SSA - will only remain viable if massive subsidies (or
devaluations) are used to hold up real grower prices against the world 
price trend. Whatever the short run need to sustain/raise export 
earnings from these resources subsidizing long run losers and pushing 
domestic real prices up (or holding them up) against declining real world 
market prices is doubtful economic logic. One possible escape is via 
production cost reductions and especially production cost reductions in 
respect to import content which would increase net export earnings at any 
give price and volume.
30. One branch of the import saving route lies in efficient import 
substitution. Light engineering (especially for items like tanks, vats, 
pipes), maintenance and heavy, low value inputs have substantial natural 
protection. There should be substantial efficient import substitution 
potential especially but not only in mining and in construction inputs. 
This has the related benefit that it would increase linkages and lay a 
sound light engineering and capital goods base for further, more general 
development. Zimbabwe's experience in this regard has been positive as 
was Zambia's until forex and copper price constraints sent these sectors 
into reverse leading both to higher cost imported inputs and to higher 
down times and growing deterioration of the mines (all unit cost 
increasing). Therefore, selective import substitution of commodity 
inputs deserves studies on a commodity by commodity, input cluster by 
input cluster basis. Domestic transport costs are another area in which 
initial examination suggests a study of potential for and ways to 
reduction should have priority.
31. General cost reducing increases often relate to plant breeding and/or 
agricultural techniques (or in mining to analogous ore treatment and ore 
extraction technology shifts). New copper mines tend to be open cast 
with ore processing attuned to lower grades and - especially when using 
low grade ore - to have lower unit cost than existing SSA ones. SSA has 
- at least partly but not fully - adopted hybrid, high yield, short (low 
picking cost) oil palms. But even in oil palms it has been left behind 
at the next round. Malaysian plant breeding/cloning has produced oil 
palms whose yields are so much higher that SSA is now a higher cost
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producer even with much lower daily earnings levels. A similar position 
appears to apply in respect to cocoa. If SSA does not have, or have 
access to, research on cost reduction comparable to LA and SEA it will be 
pushed into being a high cost producer of its own basic exports e.g. 
vegetable oils, coffee, cocoa, tea, copper which would compound problems 
of export level declines and inadequate net producer incomes.
32. Again a quick survey commodity by commodity could identify:
a. known, applied (outside SSA or only rarely in SSA) cost reducing 
innovations;
b. potential (and by what research routes) for additional breakthroughs.
On that basis a hard priority research programme for particular
commodities could be identified.
V. Marketing
33. Marketing poses a number of opportunities - varying by country as well as 
by commodity - and an equal number of requirements for research leading 
in many cases to technical assistance. The form of markets to use; ways 
of breaking de facto oligopsonist buying rings; creating real exporter 
enterprise participation (public, private, joint venture); locating new 
markets (i.e. new destinations); capitalising on/promoting expanded use 
when exogenous favourable events occur;
34. A number of issues as to how to sell have arisen, been debated and led to
diverse action and very unequal results. Some producing country auctions
- e.g. tobacco in Zimbabwe, cotton in Tanzania - seem to have resulted in 
a higher share of terminal market prices going to producing countries. 
Others - at least at times - appear to have had the reverse effect 
(perhaps because of buyer rings). Examples include coffee in Tanzania 
and tea in Kenya in 1960s, early 1970s. Still others have (perhaps 
because of too high reserve prices or other managerial problems) been 
unable to clear the crop - e.g. cotton in Sudan on several occasions over 
past two decades. Selling via Northern terminal market auctions also has
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a mixed record (both for spot and forward sales) e.g. cocoa by Ghana 
Cocoaboard has had marked successes in late 1950s/early 1960s and in 1986 
(world price fell/Ghana average receipts rose) but severe losses were 
incurred in the middle 1970s. In sisal forward selling on London market 
by Tanzania Sisal Authority has resulted in huge losses on repeated 
occasions (versus spot sales).
35. An intermediate form is contracts tied to terminal market prices e.g. 
copper standard form contract. At the other end are negotiated sales 
between sellers of varying degrees of oligopoly power (i.e. producer, 
export house, single channel) and sellers varying as to oligopsony power 
(e.g. users, trading firms, state monopoly buyers in respect to cashew 
sales to India). The results again vary widely apparently relating to 
knowledge balance, ability to hold out/hold off, degree of oligopoly - 
competition - oligopsory and bargaining tactics, e.g. tobacco and cashew 
results for Tanzania vary widely and apparently erratically from year to 
year (contrasted to final market prices for tobacco and cashew kernels).
36. Studies are needed for major commodities on the structures of global 
marketing and their implications for local auctions, spot and/or forward 
sales on terminal markets, terminal market tied contracts and directly 
negotiated contracts. The main elements influencing results for 
different commodities, countries and time periods should be identifiable 
and - probably - lead to a set of policy guidelines for improving the 
share of final commodity value turning up at Fob level.
37. Producer country intervention in markets to break price rings/increase 
competition has on occasion been effective. In coffee the setting up of 
an arms length subsidiary of the Tanzania Coffee Board to identify user 
buyers and then bid at the Arusha coffee auction had dramatic effects. A 
narrow ring was broken, prices seem to have been raised 10 to 20%; the 
'dummy* company became the third largest exporter and regularly makes 
profits on its merchanting; two to three smaller private Tanzanian firms 
entered the export merchanting business and made a go of it. But not all 
such experiences have worked - it is believed several other coffee cases 
have resulted in heavy losses to the 'dummy' merchanting companies. A 
study of experiences (not just in coffee) should show how this type of 
artificial competition creation can be operated to ensure net gains
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(higher auction price plus - or minus - merchanting company profit or 
loss) and what levels of gains are likely to be attainable for what crops 
under what circumstances.
38. For at least some commodities, new markets in developing countries
including those in Africa are practicable as already noted above in 
respect to diversification. For example continentally Africa is a cotton 
exporter but a substantial number of countries - in both North Africa and 
SSA - are importers. African cotton imports do not come from SSA - 
indeed the dominant source appears to be the USA. In most cases they
need to import more as textile output is below both capacity and 
effective demand - expansion depends on two way trade expansion. Cotton 
is not unique: sugar, tea, cocoa, coffee, oilseeds/vegetable oil are
other examples. These markets have historically been served from the 
North while the exporters buying in Africa looked to the North not to the 
rest of Africa. Present communications, markets, corporate and transport 
patterns are likely to continue these cross flows. This suggests in 
intra-African commodity trade there is both the need and the chance 
(absence of entrenched competition) for African commercial enterprises 
(public or private). Specific commodity and market studies should be 
able to identify concrete cases and opportunities for such trade 
diversification and expansion.
39. A related market development cluster turns on acting on exogenous 
favourable developments. Two cases - the first largely missed to date - 
illustrate. Pyrethrum is a well established natural insecticide input 
for household, dairying, horticultural and truck farming uses. It has 
tended to lose market share to synthetic chemicals because pyrethrum has 
a very short effective life and is fairly mild (especially it is 
innocuous to all warm blooded animals). But these weaknesses should have 
been used as marketing strengths with the rise of environmental concerns 
from the late 1960s. Pyrethrum breaks down fast with no residue - highly 
desirable in its core uses. Unfortunately in the late 1960s a single, 
traditional firm handled the bulk of world extract production and 
marketing. It did not see the possibilities. Despite the erosion of its 
share there has been no promotion, no location of partners able to 
develop/promote mixed pyrethrurn/synthetic biodegradeable, no residue 
insecticides. The opportunity remains open. Shea nut trade has moved
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from local vegetable oil input to an input into high quality Northern 
soft/skin friendly soaps and cosmetic preparations. The Cocoboard in 
* Ghana has responded and has improved procurement access and prices. The 
issue here is what further opportunities exist - if any. Presumably shea 
nuts and pyrethrum are not unique and a review of main commodities to
identify further opportunities would be appropriate.
40. A more general issue is the potential for direct African economy
participation in the international marketing segment of the commercial 
chain. The case for doing so is to increase the share of terminal market 
prices going to the African economies. Whether this share goes to 
marketing enterprise surpluses or to producers (or for that matter taxes) 
is secondary. Similarly the issues of location (acting from the African 
country using electronic communication or utilising offices in Northern 
terminal market countries), form (merchanting, broking, etc), ownership
(private, public, joint venture) are contextual, specific and secondary. 
In general African primary commodity exporting economies do not 
participate very much in marketing beyond selling domestically at auction 
or by contract. As noted above, some export companies (both private and 
public) have grown up in the context of auctions but these are the 
exception rather than the rule. Other small scale exporters do exist but 
usually they sell Fob to North importers for whom they serve as de facto 
collection and forwarding agents.
41. Two more substantial bodies of exceptions exist. Some marketing bodies
maintain an overseas presence for information collection and dealing.
The experience is mixed the Ghana Cocoaboard (as noted above) did very 
well and the Tanzania Sisal Authority very badly. Thus while the latter 
certainly injected a producing country into the international marketing 
chain it did so at the price of lower Fob sisal prices and, therefore, 
national share in the final price than could have been received by 
producing estates dealing with merchants or through foreign agents in 
East Africa (as the Kenya estates did). It would be desirable to 
identify what characteristics (of a commodity market structure and of a 
producing country marketer) are likely to lead to a successful outcome of 
an entry into international marketing. Whether these vary from 
agricultural commodity to commodity is not a priori clear - the presence 
of related products and processed forms (e.g. oilseeds and vegetable
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oils) or of a myriad of sub-products and grades (tropical timber, hides 
and skins) are, at the least, likely to affect the appropriate enterprise 
operating strategy as well as increasing the complexity of its knowledge 
requirements.
H2 . The secondary category consists of mineral export marketing corporations. 
Base metals (plus ferrochrome and asbestos for Zimbabwe and cobalt for 
Zambia) are handled by single channel agency marketing firms. In general 
these are not merchants but agents working for a fee. They are designed 
more to avert transfer pricing and its relatives than to integrate 
forward into international marketing as such. By their nature, however, 
they do undertake the latter. Both appear to be successful - i.e. they 
have apparently raised average Fob value of covered exports and 
themselves earned profits. Their methods of operation apparently range 
from normal broking via terminal markets through contract sales to 
vetting transactions actually set up by the producing companies. Mineral 
marketing probably is an area in which more general use of such companies 
(or compulsory use of domestic private export brokers if these had 
adequate experience, finance and independence of buyers/sellers) would be 
practicable and value adding. A study of the Zambia and Zimbabwe cases 
and any others which are identified should throw light on this question.
43. The last group of companies are those linked to and operated to maintain 
surveillance over the prices paid by the world's most successful (to its 
operators and to producers) commodity agreement - the Central Selling 
Organisation of De Beers for gem diamonds. The longest established is 
Tanzania’s with a London base and a fully Tanzanian valuation staff to 
cross-check grading (and therefore prices paid). Whether the diamond 
market - a durable cartel run by a commercial enterprise, an 
oligopolistic differentiated monopoly selling system and over 2000 grades 
- is so special that no general principles applicable elsewhere can be 
identified is unclear. A preliminary study of African diamond producer 
participation in the marketing process might help answer that question.
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VI. Processing And Manufacturing; Value Added and Industrial Value
*14. Processing and manufacturing has been seen both as a means to increase
export value without the depressive effect of quantity increases and as a 
growth pole or sector around which to build an industrialisation 
strategy. Logically these two goals are separate although in practice a 
primary export based industry may in fact serve both (or neither).
45. This is an area in which there are no common answers across commodities
nor probably across countries (independent of the commodity composition 
of their exports). Some commodities are virtually unprocessable beyond a 
first stage (e.g. uranium ore to uranium oxide) for technological as well 
as cost and scale reasons. For very small outputs (e.g. tin ore and 
oilseeds) shipping in semi-unprocessed form (e.g. concentrate and cotton 
seed) may be enforced by diseconomies of scale for small processing 
units. More generally value added in certain stages may be small and 
highly capital and energy intensive (e.g. certain stages in the copper 
chain). At manufacturing level somewhat different considerations apply. 
Quality control and preservation - as well as export shipping - may be 
expensive and erratic enough to render production in African producing 
countries unviable beyond domestic or (perhaps) regional markets, e.g. 
chocolate (albeit probably not cocoa and certainly not cocoa powder, 
butter, oil and mass). If style and quality control are critical, 
special barriers to entry exist - especially if style changes rapidly. 
Textiles, garments and shoes illustrate the quality control problem 
(which is soluble) and some lines of each style one (which requires 
non-African input, rapid communication and flexibility in production to 
resolve). When bulky associated inputs must be imported (e.g. milk for 
chocolate) and especially when the African raw material is - in value 
terms - a relatively small proportion of the final product (e.g. most tin 
using manufactured goods and most copper manufactures other than wire, 
cable and table/houseware) the viability of commodity production site 
located manufacturing is weakened or destroyed. Similar problems arise 
if the manufactured form is weight or volume gaining (e.g furniture, 
albeit probably not furniture parts and assemblies) because this 
increases shipping cost.
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46. This list of limitations is not to be read as a counsel to do nothing 
(let alone that there is nothing to be done) but as an underlining of the 
need for case by case study and for identification of those processing 
stages and manufactured products offering the largest and most readily 
achievable gains in the short and medium run. Opportunities do exist and 
in general they have been understressed in both export and domestic 
market oriented industrial strategies. Africa does not - and for the 
foreseeable future most African countries will not - have advantages in 
either skill levels above or labour costs per unit of production below 
many other Third World or Northern sites. There are exceptions. 
Mauritius has relatively productive semi skilled labour and few 
alternative employment prospects, a situation to some extent shared by 
Tunisia. For them labour input only imported materials/exported products 
may be a necessary and a practicable component in development strategy. 
Zimbabwe and Egypt also are relatively well placed in possessing 
productive semi skilled labour forces but have a wider array of relevant 
domestic inputs so need not center industrial exports solely (or even 
primarily) on combining local labour with imported materials. Clearly 
training, education and experience can increase productivity (reduce real 
labour cost per unit of output consistent with stable or rising real 
wages) but few African countries can expect a breakthrough on this front 
before 2000. Thus the one clear advantage they may have for export 
oriented processing or manufacturing is their primary commodity base.
47. Three exogenous factors inhibit use of that advantage. Formal tariff
discrimination against processed and manufactured forms is often high.
Established North processors and manufactures do use their established 
positions to limit access either on their own or with governmental 
assistance. Adequate data to guide articulation of commodity sector 
industrialisation are in short supply.
48. Studies on tariff escalation (nil on primary form, intermediate on
processed, high on final product) do exist. So do ones showing that the
GATT process of tariff reduction has, if anything, tended to heighten the
escalation problem. For African purposes what is needed is a tabulation 
commodity by commodity and form by form of tariff (and quota) barriers in 
major export markets. This should be useful to the African, and G 77, 
groups in the current GATT round as it would pinpoint targets for
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achievement in bargaining.
49- For Africa "the twelve" (EEC) are a special case. With few exceptions 
tariff escalation and - at present - formal quotas against processed or 
manufactured forms are rare. But they are not non-existent - especially 
in the form of the Byzantine rules for determining origin which can rule 
out - e.g. - ACP tinned fruit if the tinplate come from Japan even if the 
fruit, the other inputs and the plant are unambiguously ACP. Further 
access is not secure - under derogation clauses EEC can impose quotas 
unilaterally (after consultation but without the need for agreement). 
These exceptions and risks matter. They do limit trade directly and even 
more by raising doubts as to the viability of processing and 
manufacturing directed to the EEC market. That market - in terms of 
size, location and composition of demand - is the main one for African 
commodity based exports. A study (jointly with the ACP Secretariat) 
should identify which processed and manufactured products are now 
restricted and which ones are widely perceived to face quota or other 
access barriers if exports rise rapidly. It could identify specific 
changes to the rules of origin and to derogation clauses which would 
reduce limitations on access now and risks of unilateral future 
restrictions on access which the ACP states could seek to negotiate with 
the EEC.
50. Private restraint of trade usually involves symbiosis among importers - 
wholesalers - domestic producers. It can limit access to markets for 
competitive African exporters. For example in the case of sisal,
Eurocord (a de______facto, unregistered cartel of
importing/wholesaling/producing firms) manages an unofficial but 
effective quota system in most (not all) EEC national markets to limit 
(not wholly prevent) sisal twine imports from Africa in order to maintain 
the viability of their European production units. Information on such 
restraints is almost totally anecdotal or fragmentary. Both African and 
North states have been unaware of, reluctant to push complaints and/or 
slow to invoke even existing competition legislation to counter them. A 
systematic study of for which processed/manufactured commodities in which 
markets such constraints exist; how severe they are now; what increase in 
severity would arise if processing/manufacture before export expanded; 
what can be done is needed (logically of interest to GATT and/or ITO).
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51. What can be done need not be limited to producer state complaints and 
receiving state response. In some cases that may be the least 
practicable route. If there are markets without such restraints 
promotion can be targetted on them. If significant North markets are 
outside the grove in whose interest it is to restrict imports (e.g. 
agricultural co-op Federations and some large agricultural input supply 
firms in respect to sisal twine in EEC) direct selling links can be 
established with them. If present North producers could better redeploy 
their production to Africa (which is - e.g. - probably the case for sisal 
twine) joint ventures or foreign direct investment plants may ease market 
access consistent with African producer economy net export and value 
added gains.
52. As noted above, semi-taxonomic surveys of products by product potential 
are needed for major African export commodities. From them promising 
products can be identified for more detailed studies which would, in 
turn, form a basis from which particular countries could identify cases 
justifying sub-sectoral and/or plant feasibility studies.
53. Although commodity based processing or manufacturing for export minimises 
the impact of low productivity and high real unit labour costs 
(especially at combined wage and salary levels) it does not eliminate 
them or the need for parallel action to erode these comparative 
disadvantages. Identification of ways to increase productivity (and 
adequacy of supply) of semi skilled labour, artisans (especially in 
preventive and routine maintenance) and middle managers are needed for 
the commodities/products the taxonomic survey identifies as promising. 
This is a field related to less targetted past and ongoing ILO work.
54. A number of specific possibilities can be identified and can serve to 
identify some of the practical problems which arise in capitalising on 
them. Cocoa processing to cocoa butter, powder and paste can yield 
substantial net value added. There is a significant trade in these 
products (North-North even more than Africa-North). For African 
producers access to the EEC market has no present barriers. At least 
some chocolate and chocolate product manufacturers appear to view this 
end of their business as low profit and to be willing to phase it out if
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and as they can be assured of dependable intermediate input supplies. 
The Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon processing industries appear to be 
profitable.
55. But a relatively small (even if by no means negligible) proportion of 
African cocoa is processed before export and the share is not growing 
rapidly. In Ghana a combination of less than optimally designed plant, 
deferred maintenance, low capacity utilisation and unsuccessful marketing 
appears to cause a net export revenue loss as well as a net profit 
deficit. In none of the three countries does phased development toward 
100Í pre-export processing appear to have been studied seriously, let 
alone adopted. This would appear to be a set of products deserving 
detailed study of potential, of problems and of how to overcome them.
56. Cocoa (the powdered beverage form) poses different problems centred on 
marketing. Almost certainly promotion of African brands would be 
expensive and probably ineffectual for a decade or two after substantial 
production began (although Indian and Sri Lankan experience with tea 
might be worth studying). Therefore either links with major sellers 
(e.g. chain stores) to manufacture under their brand name or joint 
ventures with present substantial (but not necessarily leading) cocoa 
manufacturers are likely to be a necessary part of strategy for viable 
development of this product.
57. Processed, blended, packeted tea is intermediate between cocoa 
intermediates and beverage cocoa as to commercialisation. Substantial 
home market oriented production of quality as well as utility tea exists 
in several Eastern and Southern African countries. Some have broken 
through into extra-regional exports but usually in specialty or 
peripheral channels. As with beverage cocoa, major breakthroughs would 
appear to depend on arrangements creating an incentive for a firm with 
existing market access and brand acceptance to purchase the African 
product.
58. Instant coffee is in some respects rather like processed tea. However, 
doubts exist on how generally it is an efficient export manufacturing 
line. For West African robusta it appears to be. For East African 
arabica (unless the 'reject' grades - cherry buni and tex - can be the
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basic input) it is probably a net export revenue loser. The reason is 
simple - high grade coffee fetches a higher price as beans and most 
instant coffee is made from low price beans. To produce standard instant 
coffee from high quality arabica (or even on occasion robusta) is a money 
and export value losing game as Tanzania has found to its cost. Only a 
link to an established firm in the limited (but growing) premium 
quality/price instant coffee niche could redress that and it would 
involve technically complex, unforgiving of minor errors freeze drying 
and granulation plant with high output/capital and employment capital 
ratios. Therefore, while worth exploration, it is probably not an 
attractive short term prospect.
59. Sugar tends to enter international trade from Africa in "raw” (actually 
semi-manufactured) not refined form. This is economically irrational in 
terms of resource use. The cost of refining as the final stage in an 
integrated cane to refined process is much lower than the cost of 
producing raw and then separately refining it in another plant. Two 
factors - both historic - explain this pattern. Refined sugar requires 
more care in transport than raw because the latter will be reprocessed in 
any case so that partial caking or staining is of limited importance. As 
there is global long distance trade in refined sugar this barrier is 
almost certainly technically and financially surmountable. The real 
barrier is that the vested interests of the uneconomic Northern cane 
refiners have been built into the key EEC and USA preferential access 
allocations. Whether literally specifying raw sugar, designating 
refiners as importers or failing to provide for any commercial channels
for South refined sugar exports they provide massive protection to North
refiners (who in general admit they could not compete with unrestricted 
South refined sugar imports).
60. Cigarettes (and pipe tobacco) on purely economic (cost and value added) 
criteria are probably rational manufacturing lines for major tobacco 
producing countries who can combine relatively large home markets with 
substantial potential export volume to justify large scale plants and
associated production of packaging materials (and perhaps filters). It 
may be that Zimbabwe is the only African producer which meets that test 
with Malawi, Kenya and Tanzania borderline and Uganda a future
possibility once the tobacco industry is rehabilitated.
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61. But the economic logic is at this stage irrelevant to actual 
possibilities. Cigarettes are sold by brand in a global marketing system 
dominated by a few companies - a system examined in detail in UNCTAD's 
path-breaking study. These companies own, are partners in, sell 
technology to and/or license use of internationally known brand names to 
all or virtually all African cigarette companies. They de facto ban 
exports (except to small adjacent markets, e.g. the Comores for Tanzania) 
by the African companies and sales by them to firms which subsequently 
export. In the North they also dominate distribution channels and access 
to state tobacco monopolies/sales regulatory bodies where these exist.
62. Frontal assaults on the cigarette oligopoly are impracticable. Three 
routes to gain access need exploration first as to potential and second 
as to practicality. The first is to forbid export restrictions (de facto 
or de jure) on domestic plants and/or trading companies to whom they 
sell. This could open up not insignificant markets in West Asia (e.g. 
for Zimbabwe). The second is to explore production for CMEA markets - a 
line India has pursued successfully. The third is to locate secondary 
established marketers in the North (e.g. chain stores with own brands) to 
whom to sell. The last seem to hold only 1 to 5% of the market in major 
North economies, but relative to potential African exports that is by no 
means as insignificant as it appears at first glance.
6 3. Textiles and garments, taken together are historically a major entry 
point into global manufacturing exports for many developing countries 
(albeit not necessarily for cotton producers). The problems posed by the 
gross violation of the GATT principles and terms incongruously put under 
GATT auspices in the Multifibre Arrangements governing South-North and 
East-West, but not Northwest-Northwest or North-South, trade in textiles 
and garments are well studied and will not be rehearsed here. However, 
as small new entrants and because of CAP/EEC Convention provisions the 
MFA should not be seen as an absolute (perhaps in most cases not even a 
major short run) barrier to initial export build-up by SSA states. 
(Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia - which are cotton importers - and Egypt 
face somewhat different access constraints for textiles and garments from 
SSA cotton producers seeking to build up significant textile and/or 
garment exports.)
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64. Textiles and garments are very broad categories. There is an urgent need 
to identify which sub-categories are most promising. Study after study 
has shown that cotton grey unbleached is not promising. It is homogenous 
and sold wholly on price. Therefore, established Asian producers can 
certainly undercut African. But this standard answer to SSA cotton 
producers asking what they should manufacture for export is inherently 
incomplete. It fails to address (presumably because information is not 
as readily available off the shelf for other products as it is for grey 
unbleached) what products might be viable.
65. For textiles preliminary revealed viability results suggest 
semi-processed forms (e.g. yarn) with very high commodity value share and 
substantial weight saving and specialty dyed fabrics of African design or 
style (e.g. khanga, kitenge, West African wax prints) and at the narrow 
end of the market tie/die. In these products design matters, African 
provenance (if quality is good) can be a positive selling point; 
cut-throat price competition is less ubiquitous and severe. Identifying 
commercial channels is necessary because it is not a homogenous mass 
market. The probable ones are: broad range textile importers,
wholesalers, retail chains on the one hand and specialty traders perhaps 
(especially those oriented to the black North American and Caribbean 
markets) on the other. For countries with very limited export 
experience, advice on and technical assistance in ways and means of 
identifying, contacting, contracting, price negotiating with, quality 
control for and assuring dependable supply flows to these markets is 
likely to be a necessary ingredient for success. Up to $50 million or 
metres 20 million, serious access barriers are not self-evidently likely 
and that level - while not huge - would represent substantial export 
diversification for, e.g. Tanzania, Uganda, the Sudan, Mali, Burkina, 
Niger, Cameroon or even Zimbabwe.
66. Garments are in some respects similar to textiles in respect to the need 
to identify specific lines or market niches. These are unlikely to 
include - e.g. - plain or simply printed T Shirts. Whether utility lines 
like blue jeans are viable in unclear. At one period the Cote d'Ivoire 
did appear on the threshold of a breakthrough. That period is now past. 
The reasons should be studied. The foreign firms producing there have 
tended to stress quality control problems. Some outside analysts have
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suggested shifting of production back to European plants had little to do 
with the underlying viability of Ivoirien production. A study to 
v determine which factor (or the two in what combination) led to the
decline could be useful. Quality control is a different problem from 
identifying a producer, partner or buyer whose conflicts of interest 
(with own group production at home) are low. Specialty garments (from 
specialty fabrics) may be promising. Oddly present successes - e.g. in 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe - seem to be in the high price, low volume, 
fashion end of this market where style and quality (but not - within 
limits - price) are crucial and competitive. The conditions facilitating 
their success need to be identified more clearly. But so do the issues 
related to the viability of more standard, higher volume lines, e.g. 
shirts or frocks made from khanga, kitenge or kente style prints.
67. A special problem relates to the trend toward use of artificial (rayon) 
and synthetic (nylon, acrylic) fibres or mixes of these with cotton. 
These fibres are not produced in SSA - albeit Swaziland does produce the 
basic wood pulp input for rayon. Nor except for rayon (itself losing 
ground) are they likely to be. Whether blend production for export would 
be viable probably varies sharply from case to case. Similarly in the 
North there seems to have been some stabilisation or revival of pure 
cotton cloth's use in shirts and summer frocks because of its greater 
comfort and porosity when temperatures and humidity levels are high. 
Saleability and net export gains are both necessary conditions - how they 
interact requires further examination.
68. Leather should replace hides and skins in African export statistics. In 
this case the intermediate form - "wet blue" - is apparently usually cost 
inefficient compared either to raw hides and skins or the tanned leather 
form. India has gained substantially from a total cessation of raw 
exports and their conversion to leather and leather products (backed up 
by a hides and skins export ban). Over the medium term Africa should 
seek to follow the same path.
6 9. However, certain very real problems need to be faced before and during 
such a transition. General quality levels need tightening and to the 
extent possible homogenisation. This, perhaps oddly, requires more 
individual attention to raw hides and skins which (universally, not only
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in Africa) vary in ways requiring different treatment during tanning to 
produce uniformly acceptable results. Supply to some tanneries (e.g. 
Tanzania and Somalia) has been erratic and low even when - on the face of 
it - adequate production of hides and skins was taking place. In part 
this relates to overvalued exchange rates and the relative portability of 
hides and skins which interacted to make them a significant item in 
smuggling. But in some cases it may also relate to weak procurement 
systems since the raw hide and skin market is usually characterised by 
large numbers of traders and by fragmentation.
70. Limited - but real - success in establishing leather products exports has 
been made by a number of African countries, e.g. Morocco, Zimbabwe. 
These appear to be largely specialty market oriented, e.g. safari shoes, 
belts, handbags, poufs and cushions albeit Zimbabwe has some standard 
shoe exports. Standard shoe (and shoe part), luggage-handbag-purse, belt 
and accessory markets are much larger than specialty and are not - in- 
general - characterised by sudden massive style shifts. Therefore, the 
conditions for successful entry into them by potential large exporters -
e.g. Nigeria, Botswana, perhaps Somalia, Tanzania, Cameroon and the 
landlocked Sahelian states - deserve study. Style and quality control 
are key and probably interact with establishing links to major North 
buyers who can provide inputs into both. The experience of Brazil and 
India is worth study to identify possible pitfalls and potentials. It is 
also worth exploring the possibility of TCDC and export credit financed 
South-South machinery trade in this area and in tanning from India and/or 
Brazil to Africa. At least in the case of India, complementary interests 
may outweigh competitive because continued African hides and skins 
exports have, apparently, depressed the leather market to India's 
disadvantage.
71. Wood products have three stages: sawn timber (versus logs), plywood and 
veneer, finished products or components (e.g. furniture and parts, tea 
chests). Certain considerations vary by stage. One which is common to 
most products and probably more significant for wood (and oilseed) 
products than for most others is use of by-products and rejects. For 
example, the difference between viability and unviability of a sawmill 
can - in Finland, apparently often does - depend on whether sawdust and 
trimmings are used for generating power and/or turned into particle board
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or thrown away. In plywood and veneer the domestic market (or absence
thereof) for off-sizes and slight off-grades can be crucial. To a lesser
extent the same considerations apply to textiles, garments, leather and 
shoes. 10% slightly imperfect (non-exportable but serviceable) output is 
often acceptable if, and only if, it can be sold on the domestic market 
at a reasonable price.
72. Sawn timber adds value for utility wood. It also reduces bulk and weight
which is a transport cost advantage and can be self-powering and/or local 
building material generating (sawdust and off-cuts). Why it is a 
relatively low proportion of export volume relative to logs in most SSA 
producers is unclear. For high value timbers with specialty uses and the 
need to avoid waste of wood, simple sawing is likely to prove uneconomic.
73* Plywood and veneer were rising export industries in several West and East 
African countries in the 1960s and early 1970s. They have lost ground in
most cases since then. One reason has been overvalued exchange rates and
another inadequate foreign exchange licenses for maintenance and 
production imports leading to quality as well as quantity falls. On the 
face of it the underlying economic viability - if the wood produced is 
suitable for this purpose - remains.
74. Tea chests and furniture raise market access, volume and weight increase 
and - at least for furniture - style problems. Utility products like tea 
chests sell on price - given acceptable uniform quality and reliable 
delivery. Many - including tea chests - can be shipped in knocked down 
(pre-assembly) form to avoid transport cost raising volume increases. 
With relatively few significant buyers, however, a set of bulk,
multi-year contracts may be needed. Furniture probably requires foreign 
inputs as to style and marketing - and perhaps to be shipped unassembled. 
Given solutions to those barriers, African production should be
competitive.
75. Vegetable oil and - at manufactured stage - margarine and ghee are value 
adding, weight saving processes within African technical capabilities. 
In the past quality control has been a major problem even at the single 
expressed let alone triple refined stage. However, in the cases of palm 
oil (necessarily as palm fruit is highly perishable and expressing very
(V
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bulk and weight saving) and groundnut oil, there are significant exports. 
This seems less true of cottonseed oil (perhaps because many cotton 
exporters are also vegetable oil deficit countries). Given shipping, 
packaging and branding considerations, bulk exports (whether at raw,
refined or hydrogenated stage) may be more practicable than final user 
packaging of exports.
76. Margarine production for export in the tropics is feasible and can - 
apparently - be economically viable vide Malaysia. Why only domestic (or 
occasionally domestic plus regional) market plants exist in SSA is 
unclear. Further study may be needed to ascertain whether export 
oriented production would be viable and, if so, using which vegetable 
oils.
77. Ghee (clarified butter) does have an international market and is produced
in Africa, but not for export. Together with dried skim milk (for the
domestic market) it might make dairying in areas far from major markets 
viable, e.g. in Tanzania's Morogoro and Lake Zone Regions and in 
Somalia's Central Rangelands. Market and market channel identification 
is needed as, on the face of it, the main attractive markets lie in West 
Africa.
78. For vegetable oils, use of by-products - hulls and oil cake - is usually 
crucial to viability. In principle this should not be hard - oil cake is 
a standard animal feed supplement with potential local fattening and 
actual global livestock feed markets. Hulls and similar dry waste can be 
used to produce heat or power.
79. Packaged fruits and vegetables (including processed forms such as jam or 
ketchup) tend to have particularly high net to gross additional export 
ratios. In general their agricultural inputs could not be grown on the 
same scale without the export market provided by packaging. A possible 
spin-off gain might be possible from using sound but slightly imperfect 
or too near full ripeness to transport portions of direct export 
horticultural production (e.g. green beans, tomatoes, mangoes, citrus). 
However, they often face supply side-problems except in peak seasons,
e.g. in East Africa oranges are available almost year round but only 
during a two to three month peak season are prices low enough for them to
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be a viable base for tinned juice production. One possible solution is 
dedicated production - e.g. of pineapples - albeit for a highly seasonal 
crop shortage at low seasons can be averted only at the expense of gluts 
at high (when domestic sale of the surplus will be neither easy nor 
lucrative). Another is flexibility built into the plant to allow
seasonal shifts in ouput to match the cycle of peak harvest periods -
e.g. tomato paste or tomatoes, citrus segments or juice, palm soup, 
garden eggs, okra in West African forest or coastal zones. In such 
cycles not all products need to be exportable if adequate domestic
markets exist.
80. What products? Which markets? How purchased? One consideration is 
whether an adequate combined domestic and export market exists together 
with a dependably adequate basic input supply. While theoretically 
obvious, Africa is littered with semi-operational or silent plants for 
which the answer to one question at least was (and should have been
foreseen to be) no. Markets can be broad - e.g. tinned tomatoes and 
paste, citrus and pineapple segments and juices, fruit jams - or 
specialty - e.g. okra, garden eggs, mango products, palm soup. The 
questions are whether enough accessible market size at a price adequate 
to ensure viability exists and whether access can in fact be secured and 
sustained. While the standard markets targetted are Western Europe and 
North America, for some products substantial potential may exist in the 
CMEA countries, Japan and West Asia.
81. Packaging questions are crucial because packaging can account for a high 
share of costs and is frequently import intensive. Glass might be 
optimal on these grounds but has to date been ruled out (except for jams) 
on fragility grounds. This may need re-examination - substantial 
intercontinental and international (North-North and East-West) trade in 
glass packaged foods does exist. Paper probably is too fragile for 
intercontinental shipping. Tinning (canning) remains standard but, 
whether in aluminium or tinplate, does have a high import content and - 
especially when local tin production is high cost as is frequently true 
in Africa - may also pare away at competitivity and/or force very low 
payments to food producers.
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82. Meat products are somewhat similar to fruits and vegetables but diverge 
in significant ways. For high or middle quality meat with access to high 
price markets (e.g. Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe EEC quota beef), 
tinning would be a negative value added process. Meat packing to the 
individual cuts (as opposed to whole carcass or quarter) stage is likely 
to add value and save freight (indeed to make air freight viable). Meat 
packing is an industry in which by-product use is essential. Tinning of 
off-cuts, tanning of hides and skins, glue production from hooves and 
bones, meat extract extraction from odds and ends, conversion of fat to 
cooking products and industrial tallow (e.g. for soap), processing of 
blood, offal and bones (for culinary, animal feed or fertiliser use) are 
examples. In at least some cases the problems of African plants may 
relate to failure to valorize these by-products systematically.
8 3. Meat tinning (for domestic and/or export sale) may be viable under three 
circumstances. First, for off-cuts from export or domestic meat packing. 
Second, in isolated areas from which transport of live cattle and/or 
carcasses - cuts is either impractical or unviable. Third, for seasonal 
gluts and or animals not fit for international transport in live beast 
exporting countries. Zimbabwe, Botswana and - on independence - Namibia 
exemplify the first case. Some of the Sahelian landlocked states may fit 
into the second (although this is not at all self-evident). Somalia and 
perhaps the Sudan exemplify the third.
84. The standard tinned meat product which is relatively easy to produce to 
export standards and to market to holders of established brands is corned 
beef. However, globally this is a stagnant or declining market. Only if 
Latin American and Australasian meat exporters move upmarket (into fresh 
cuts and/or different tinned products) is there likely to be much space 
for new entrants. Further, it is - by definition - not a market for 
goats or sheep. Mince, hamburgers and meatballs are other relatively 
standard products with some significant trade volume and - probably - 
fairly easy access to marketers and better growth prospects than corned 
beef. Beyond that, research on the market, demand, imported input 
requirement, difficulty of quality controlled production and access to 
established marketers is needed.
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85. Fish is analagous to meat - at least at processing or manufacturing 
level. Trade-offs exist between filleted and tinned products (at least(V
for some types of fish). By-products - including fish meal and fish oil 
- are important to viability both to ensure useability of a range of 
species and to salvage some value from fish too bruised or stale for 
processing toward human consumption. (While fishmeal centred industries 
do exist, their viability in Africa is open to serious doubt at present 
fishmeal/fertiliser prices.) As there still is a residual dried fish 
trade (in meat it is vestigial except for small volume specialty products 
such as biltong) studies of volume and potential might be useful, e.g. 
for dried shark to the West and East Asian areas, a product of potential 
interest to several Indian Ocean coastal states - e.g. Somalia, which has 
seen the collapse of past markets for an artisanal industry in this 
product.
86. Iron and steel (plus associated by-products, e.g. titanium and/or 
vanadium in some iron ores, sulphur from some coals) are a potential 
export product for a handful of African states. The necessary 
conditions are probably reasonably high quality iron ore deposits 
relatively close to limestone and cheap fuel (coal or natural gas) 
sources plus a domestic demand for products produced by the mill of over
250,000 tonnes. Algeria and Egypt pass that basic test as does Nigeria. 
Zimbabwe would pass it if the mill production mix were realigned and 
Tanzania may meet it subject to doubts as to ore and coal quality. The 
main SSA iron ore exporters appear to lack cheap fuel sources, adequate 
domestic markets or both.
87. The reasons for these estimates is the overcrowded nature of the world 
steel market. Low cost - or high export subsidy - producers outside the 
industrial economies (e.g. Brazil, South Korea, Zimbabwe, Algeria, South 
Africa) have been able to capture markets but in the absence of low costs 
the export (or enterprise) subsidy cost are very heavy.
88. These considerations suggest that careful attention must be paid to 
construction and operating cost minimisation (which implies concentration 
of units and - especially for plants under 1 million tonnes - use of 
current, not classic, technology). The Nigerian plant's export potential 
seems, as it is presently constituted, to be prejudiced by these factors.
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Similarly product mix needs far more careful planning than it has usually 
received. There has been a tendency to concentrate on those bar, rod and 
strip products for which the world market is most glutted. Similarly, 
wide gaps in the mix - e.g. in flat steels - limit the domestic interface
which is crucial to covering overhead costs and, thereby, allowing
incremental cost pricing of exports without needing a subsidy.
8 9. Two possible additional viability situations relate to: iron ore deposits 
with valuable, low extraction cost secondary products (e.g if the 
vanadium in Tanzania's Liganga iron ore can be extracted economically, 
vanadium revenue could be almost as high as steel value); modern coastal 
resmelting mills with low cost access to scrap (presumptively from
ship-breaking given the high cost and low reliability of domestic scrap 
supplies and the ready availability and low cost of scrap ships). These 
special situations would require very careful studies and assessment of 
robustness in the face of negative variations from estimates, as it is 
historically notable how over-optimistic these often are. A more general 
study - including overall and product by product world market projections 
by region - is also needed to provide broad guidelines for detailed 
forward planning by actual or potential major, standard
producers/exporters including those hoping to target a significant 
proportion of exports on African regional or sub-regional markets.
90. The foregoing set of examples is no means taxonomic. It does seek to 
identify a number of product clusters with probable significant export 
potential based on present commodity exports or new commodity production 
targetted to or made possible by pre-export processing and manufacturing. 
In addition a number of particular problems are illustrated by reference 
to products in respect of which they are likely to be critical.
91. However, a commodity export upgrading strategy based on pre-export 
processing and manufacturing cannot reasonably be viewed in isolation 
from other industrial sub-sectors. This is not an appropriate place to 
discuss overall industrial strategy, but some key interactions may 
usefully be noted.
92. First, many commodity based industries - not least iron and steel and 
textiles and garments - have substantial domestic markets. Thus the
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distinction between export •promotion and import substitution is in a 
majority of cases somewhat unreal.
93. For some industries domestic sales of by-products (e.g. sawmills) or, of 
certain items in a product mix (e.g. in a multi-product tinning plant) or 
of serviceable but not export grade products (e.g. garments, textiles) 
will be crucial to ensuring overall economic viability. Further, it is a 
general policy globally among manufactures engaged in exporting and in 
selling to the domestic market to charge higher prices in the latter to 
cover most or all overheads (fixed costs) to allow marginal cost export 
pricing.
91!. The interaction between processed/manufactured products exporting and 
linked domestic production beyond the main primary products is 
multi-directional. In the first place production of certain intermediate 
goods may be important for reducing costs. For example, packaging 
material (cartons, chests and boxes, bags and sacks, tins and jars) tend 
to be a major input and one whose import in finished form is frequently 
prohibitively expensive. Even production with high import content 
(probably inevitable for tins though less so for other packaging) may 
reduce costs significantly. Further, some materials (e.g. cardboard from 
re-cycled paper or agricultural waste, sisal or kenaf for bags and sacks 
and glass) can be produced domestically.
95. Certain processed/manufactured exports have substantial secondary 
commodity inputs. Examples include sugar (processed fruits), salt (most 
processed foods), vegetable oil (meat and fish products), tomato sauce 
(fish products), soft wood (for pulp-paper-packaging materials). In many 
cases these commodities would not be export competitive by themselves, 
but may well be lower cost than imports thus increasing the overall 
competitiveness as well as domestic content of the processed/manufactured 
imports.
9 6. A number of the inputs into processed/manufactured commodity export 
industries are also inputs into domestic market oriented manufacturing. 
National strategies need to look at potential for expansion of - e.g. 
packaging, light engineering, spare parts - production to serve and to 
reduce costs in both the basically export and dominantly domestic market
¡V
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branches of the manufacturing sector.
VII. Information Collection, Analysis And Access
97. Lack of information is a general and generalised complaint of African 
primary product exporters at government, enterprise and 
intellectual/analytical levels. The complaints are indeed justified and 
meeting them should form part of any comprehensive agenda for bolstering 
commodity export proceeds of African states. However, to devise even a 
draft agenda for action it is necessary to categorise types of 
information needed and modalities for generating and using it.
98. One set of information needed relates to general commodity (and commodity 
based product) contexts and prospects. This is information usefully 
collected in a single programme of studies with economies of scale and 
interaction. While the earlier data is available the better, once 
compiled the data is likely to remain valid for several years especially 
if backed up by annual updating in respect to significant contextual and 
prospect changes.
99. Such information is useful as strategic dialogue and formulation inputs
and identifying areas for more detailed study. It cannot provide an 
adequate basis for specific investment decisions.
100. From the first set of information it is likely to be possible to zero in
on specific commodities and commodity based products. In some cases 
these will need to be country specific either formally or because a 
commodity or product is of interest to one or two countries only. These 
studies need to be up to pre-feasibility level as to aspects of
production, processing, marketing, etc. They do require more and more 
up-to-date commercial information and there is greater need for speed in 
preparing and for using or updating them rapidly. Because of country 
specificity there is a need for identified potential user countries to be 
able to relate directly to consultants (whether outside, UN system or 
mixed teams) and preferably to appoint one or more qualified citizens to 
the consultancy teams. The latter point is more of general 
applicability. Seconding African state personnel to all aspects of
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< information collection and information system development is a
potentially crucial way of building up national data procurement and 
analysis capacity. National - or grouped national - capacities are 
presumably the long-run aim even though the short term information supply 
augmentation will require technical assistance and/or consultancy input.
101. A related second stage set of studies - e.g. linkage industries, labour 
productivity enhancement - may need to be national. Some general points 
can be identified at the first round of studies but beyond that it is 
doubtful that cross-country studies will usually be important.
102. A quite different third set of information is up to date market data and 
analysis, particularly - but not only - for major commodities. For some 
commodities - especially those with dominant terminal markets - such 
general sources as Reuters Commodity Service go a long way toward 
providing basic data for own analysis and some independent and commercial 
expert analysis. In others commodity agreements do have at least 
rudimentary market information systems for members. However, neither 
source is available and/or adequate for many commodities. For example, 
the basic data source on cocoa is Gill and Duffus (a cocoa broker and 
merchant) and sisal/hard fibres is Wigglesworth (a hard fibre broker, 
merchant and - at least indirectly - producer). Such sources are hardly 
likely to be available to African governments or enterprises (or for that 
matter other firms engaged in the markets) as soon as to their own 
authors. No imputation of fraud or misconduct is made - simply that the 
situation is not in the interest of African producing countries. In 
cases where there is no terminal market (e.g. cashew nuts, the terminal 
market is for kernels) very little data is available promptly on 
representative transactions even though experience with other products 
(e.g. fertiliser) demonstrate it can be generated and distributed 
promptly.
103. These types of information need to be collected by commercial not 
bureaucratic type organisations and should be channelled direct (e.g. by 
telex) to users not via governmental agencies. Bureaucratic (government, 
UN agency, academic institution) data collection and analysis has its 
uses. Like an elephant it can knock down the undergrowth, cover the 
ground and move rapidly in straight lines with occasional changes of
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course. For strategic, record and basic analysis input data the 
bureaucratic approach has much to be said for it - if the elephant avoids 
going to sleep on the trail. But commercial data requirements are for 
rapid pieces of information from a variety of sources. This requires a 
different type of organisation to collect, on the animal analogy a 
hummingbird.
104. How to identify and hire, construct and finance and/or build into African 
marketing enterprises (marketing boards, auctions and/or export marketing 
companies) commercial data procurement and analysis expertise is a 
crucial as well as a difficult question. Presumably answers will vary 
for different products. Some experience (perhaps especially in relation 
to Asian and Mediterranean rather than African economies) does exist but 
does not appear to have been collected or analysed systematically. This 
might be an appropriate area for an ITO/UNCTAD study.
VIII. Reflection
105. Commodities - preferably increasingly in pre-export processed and 
manufactured form - will be central to the success or failure of attempts 
to restore African (and most African countries) earned import capacity 
from exports. Trying to do so by brute force through raising volume of 
present main exports and/or by random diversification into other standard 
commodities faces distinct limitations given commodity market prospects 
to 1995. Changing the trend (at best stagnant) via ICAs and Window 1 of 
the Common Fund seems likely to be of only limited feasibility though 
reducing fluctuations around the trend and avoiding distress selling at 
lows causing an unchecked free fall in price are more feasible 
objectives.
106. Therefore, the other (Window 2) elements of the original Integrated 
Programme for Commodities deserve re-consideration. Among them are new 
product development; locating and targetting new markets and/or uses; 
achieving cost reducing technical changes; increasing African 
participation in marketing systems; developing pre-export processing 
and/or manufacturing of present (and/or new) commodity exports; improving 
African access to and ability to use information. None of these is
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likely to provide either universally applicable possibilities or any 
panaceas. All seem likely to offer significant gains for some 
commodities from some economies.
107* If an approach along these lines is adopted, the first steps are likely 
to be dominated by information collection and analysis leading to 
specific pre-feasibility studied projects in each of the six broad topic 
areas identified. This is an appropriate area for UNDP-UNCTAD-Like 
Minded Government financed technical assistance (including seconded 
African personnel when possible). For ongoing operational projects and 
programmes an appropriate source would seem to be Window 2 of the Common 
Fund which seems likely to become operational over 1988/8 9. Indeed 
without a programme of preliminary and pre-feasibility studies there is a 
real danger that Window 2 would remain unused or dissipated on projects 
which in retrospect were seen to be of less than optimal priority.
